Hopes And Prospects (Amnesty International Lecture)
Noam Chomsky
Text of lecture given in Belfast, Ireland, October 30, 2009
Hopes and Prospects, regrettably, are not well aligned, even closely. The task is to bring them to closer alignment. Presumably that was the intent of the Nobel Peace Prize committee a few weeks ago. Their choice elicited much surprise and sometimes scorn. In defense of the committee, we might say that the achievement of doing nothing to advance peace places Obama on a considerably higher moral plane than some of the earlier recipients, whose names I will omit out of politeness.
The New York Times reported, plausibly, that "The Nobel committee's embrace of Mr. Obama was viewed as a rejection of the unpopular tenure, in Europe especially, of his predecessor, George W. Bush." The prize "seemed a kind of prayer and encouragement by the Nobel committee for future endeavor and more consensual American leadership."
The nature of the Bush-Obama transition is clearly an important question, which bears directly on the realism of the prayers and encouragement. Some light is cast on the matter by the record of the "special relationship" between the US and Britain, just reaffirmed by Hillary Clinton in London, where she came to deliver the message that, in her words, "it can't be said often enough, we have a special relationship between our countries." Repeatedly over the years, the special relationship has been put to the test, most dramatically during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. US leaders were making decisions that risked nuclear war, placing the very survival of Britain in peril. They refused to provide the British with any information, on the grounds that Europeans are not capable of the "rational and logical" approach of the bright lights of Camelot, so internal records reveal. President Kennedy warned privately that allies "must come along or stay behindÉwe cannot accept a veto from any other power." As the crisis peaked, a senior Kennedy advisor defined the "special relationship" succinctly: Britain will "act as our lieutenant (the fashionable word is partner)." Europeans of course prefer the fashionable word.
The definition captures rather well a primary difference between the Bush and Obama approach to world affairs. Under Bush, primarily during his more extremist first term, Europe was told frankly that you will do what we say or you will be "irrelevant" -- repeating openly what Kennedy said only in private, a useful insight into how much changed in 40 years with a shift from one extreme of the political spectrum to the other. The brazen arrogance of the Bush administration and its open contempt even for allies did not go over well in Europe. Obama, however, is taking his cues from JFK. In public, he approaches allies as "partners." If released, the internal record may well reveal that in private the partners are expected to be lieutenants. The Nobel committee's choice reflects the preference of European elites for the Kennedy-Obama posture.
We find much the same when we consider the reaction to public policy pronouncements. Donald Rumsfeld's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review evoked concern and condemnation, but not the far more aggressive stance of Clinton's Strategic Command, which controls nuclear weapons. It advised in 1995 that nuclear weapons must be the core of military strategy because "Unlike chemical or biological weapons, the extreme destruction from a nuclear explosion is immediate, with few if any palliatives to reduce its effect," and even if not used, nuclear weapons "always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict." We should therefore reject a "no first use policy," and make it clear that our use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear states, may "either be response or preemptive." Furthermore planners should not "portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed.... That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we project." It is "beneficial" for our strategic posture if "some elements may appear to be potentially `out of control'," a version of the "madman theory" attributed to Nixon. I know of nothing comparable in the public record, but it passed unnoticed.
Much the same was true of the projections of Clinton's Space Command and National Intelligence Council, which warned that "globalization" is likely to bring about a "widening economic divide" with "deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation" that will lead to unrest and violence among the "have-nots," much of it directed against the United States. That provides a further rationale for expanding offensive military capacities into space, with the goal of "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment [with] space-based strike weapons [enabling] the application of precision force from, to, and through space." That too passed unnoticed in the mainstream, unlike the fear, anger, and protest elicited by the brazen public posture of Bush administration figures.
Similarly, Bush's September 2002 National Security Strategy was harshly condemned for its aggressive militancy and brazen declaration of global dominance. Within weeks, in the leading establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, a prominent political analyst warned that the Bush administration is courting danger by declaring a "new imperial grand strategy [that] presents the United States [as] a revisionist state seeking to parlay its momentary advantages into a world order in which it runs the show." There was no such reaction, at home or abroad, to the Clinton doctrine, which was in fact more extreme. Under Clinton, the US officially reserved the right to act "unilaterally when necessary," including "unilateral use of military power," to defend such vital interests as "ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources," without even the pretexts of self-defense on which the Bush neocons insisted. But the Clinton doctrine was presented quietly, without crudely instructing the world that you are our lieutenants. And it was accepted with polite applause.
The acceptance of the Clinton doctrine is in fact quite natural. Much the same doctrines have been in force since the Roosevelt administration. From the outbreak of war in 1939, high-level US planners met to consider the postwar era. They recognized that whatever the outcome of the war, the US would become a global power, displacing Britain. Accordingly, they developed plans for the US to exercise control over a "Grand Area," as they called it, which was to comprise at least the Western hemisphere, the former British empire, the Far East, and of course Western Asia's energy resources. In this Grand Area the US would hold "unquestioned power" with "military and economic supremacy," and would act to ensure the "limitation of any exercise of sovereignty" by states that might interfere with its global designs. At first, planners thought that Germany might prevail in Europe, but as Russia began to grind down the Wehrmacht, the vision became more expansive, and the Grand Area was to incorporate as much of Eurasia as possible, at least Western Europe, its economic heartland.
The British understood that they were to be lieutenants. Foreign Office officials ruefully observed that guided by "the economic imperialism of American business interests, [Washington is] attempting to elbow us outÉunder the cloak of a benevolent and avuncular internationalism." The Minister of State at the Foreign Office commented to his cabinet colleagues that Americans believe "that the United States stands for something in the world -- something of which the world has need, something which the world is going to like, something, in the final analysis, which the world is going to take, whether it likes it or not." He was articulating the real-world version of what is called "Wilsonian idealism" in the international affairs literature, the version that conforms to the historical and internal record.
.
Noam Chomsky
Text of lecture given in Belfast, Ireland, October 30, 2009
Hopes and Prospects, regrettably, are not well aligned, even closely. The task is to bring them to closer alignment. Presumably that was the intent of the Nobel Peace Prize committee a few weeks ago. Their choice elicited much surprise and sometimes scorn. In defense of the committee, we might say that the achievement of doing nothing to advance peace places Obama on a considerably higher moral plane than some of the earlier recipients, whose names I will omit out of politeness.
The New York Times reported, plausibly, that "The Nobel committee's embrace of Mr. Obama was viewed as a rejection of the unpopular tenure, in Europe especially, of his predecessor, George W. Bush." The prize "seemed a kind of prayer and encouragement by the Nobel committee for future endeavor and more consensual American leadership."
The nature of the Bush-Obama transition is clearly an important question, which bears directly on the realism of the prayers and encouragement. Some light is cast on the matter by the record of the "special relationship" between the US and Britain, just reaffirmed by Hillary Clinton in London, where she came to deliver the message that, in her words, "it can't be said often enough, we have a special relationship between our countries." Repeatedly over the years, the special relationship has been put to the test, most dramatically during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. US leaders were making decisions that risked nuclear war, placing the very survival of Britain in peril. They refused to provide the British with any information, on the grounds that Europeans are not capable of the "rational and logical" approach of the bright lights of Camelot, so internal records reveal. President Kennedy warned privately that allies "must come along or stay behindÉwe cannot accept a veto from any other power." As the crisis peaked, a senior Kennedy advisor defined the "special relationship" succinctly: Britain will "act as our lieutenant (the fashionable word is partner)." Europeans of course prefer the fashionable word.
The definition captures rather well a primary difference between the Bush and Obama approach to world affairs. Under Bush, primarily during his more extremist first term, Europe was told frankly that you will do what we say or you will be "irrelevant" -- repeating openly what Kennedy said only in private, a useful insight into how much changed in 40 years with a shift from one extreme of the political spectrum to the other. The brazen arrogance of the Bush administration and its open contempt even for allies did not go over well in Europe. Obama, however, is taking his cues from JFK. In public, he approaches allies as "partners." If released, the internal record may well reveal that in private the partners are expected to be lieutenants. The Nobel committee's choice reflects the preference of European elites for the Kennedy-Obama posture.
We find much the same when we consider the reaction to public policy pronouncements. Donald Rumsfeld's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review evoked concern and condemnation, but not the far more aggressive stance of Clinton's Strategic Command, which controls nuclear weapons. It advised in 1995 that nuclear weapons must be the core of military strategy because "Unlike chemical or biological weapons, the extreme destruction from a nuclear explosion is immediate, with few if any palliatives to reduce its effect," and even if not used, nuclear weapons "always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict." We should therefore reject a "no first use policy," and make it clear that our use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear states, may "either be response or preemptive." Furthermore planners should not "portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed.... That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we project." It is "beneficial" for our strategic posture if "some elements may appear to be potentially `out of control'," a version of the "madman theory" attributed to Nixon. I know of nothing comparable in the public record, but it passed unnoticed.
Much the same was true of the projections of Clinton's Space Command and National Intelligence Council, which warned that "globalization" is likely to bring about a "widening economic divide" with "deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation" that will lead to unrest and violence among the "have-nots," much of it directed against the United States. That provides a further rationale for expanding offensive military capacities into space, with the goal of "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment [with] space-based strike weapons [enabling] the application of precision force from, to, and through space." That too passed unnoticed in the mainstream, unlike the fear, anger, and protest elicited by the brazen public posture of Bush administration figures.
Similarly, Bush's September 2002 National Security Strategy was harshly condemned for its aggressive militancy and brazen declaration of global dominance. Within weeks, in the leading establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, a prominent political analyst warned that the Bush administration is courting danger by declaring a "new imperial grand strategy [that] presents the United States [as] a revisionist state seeking to parlay its momentary advantages into a world order in which it runs the show." There was no such reaction, at home or abroad, to the Clinton doctrine, which was in fact more extreme. Under Clinton, the US officially reserved the right to act "unilaterally when necessary," including "unilateral use of military power," to defend such vital interests as "ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources," without even the pretexts of self-defense on which the Bush neocons insisted. But the Clinton doctrine was presented quietly, without crudely instructing the world that you are our lieutenants. And it was accepted with polite applause.
The acceptance of the Clinton doctrine is in fact quite natural. Much the same doctrines have been in force since the Roosevelt administration. From the outbreak of war in 1939, high-level US planners met to consider the postwar era. They recognized that whatever the outcome of the war, the US would become a global power, displacing Britain. Accordingly, they developed plans for the US to exercise control over a "Grand Area," as they called it, which was to comprise at least the Western hemisphere, the former British empire, the Far East, and of course Western Asia's energy resources. In this Grand Area the US would hold "unquestioned power" with "military and economic supremacy," and would act to ensure the "limitation of any exercise of sovereignty" by states that might interfere with its global designs. At first, planners thought that Germany might prevail in Europe, but as Russia began to grind down the Wehrmacht, the vision became more expansive, and the Grand Area was to incorporate as much of Eurasia as possible, at least Western Europe, its economic heartland.
The British understood that they were to be lieutenants. Foreign Office officials ruefully observed that guided by "the economic imperialism of American business interests, [Washington is] attempting to elbow us outÉunder the cloak of a benevolent and avuncular internationalism." The Minister of State at the Foreign Office commented to his cabinet colleagues that Americans believe "that the United States stands for something in the world -- something of which the world has need, something which the world is going to like, something, in the final analysis, which the world is going to take, whether it likes it or not." He was articulating the real-world version of what is called "Wilsonian idealism" in the international affairs literature, the version that conforms to the historical and internal record.
.