Satellite imagery confirms that Iranian capabilities are bruised, not annihilated.
Jeffrey Lewis
JUNE 27, 2025
I’ve spent the past several days telling incredulous reporters that Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran, even with help from the United States, looked anemic—and that it would, at best, set Iran’s nuclear program back by several months, maybe a year if we were lucky.
Now CNN, the New York Times, Reuters, and even a sweating Fox News are reporting on the conclusions of a five-page classified assessment of the strikes that was prepared by the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It turns out that I may have been overestimating the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. That report indicated that the strike has set Iran’s nuclear program back by one to two months on the low end and less than a year on the high end. (The CIA estimate that it would take Iran “years” to rebuild the facilities that were destroyed is beside the
point, since no one thinks Iran will do that.)
The DIA assessment relies on both satellite imagery and signals intelligence. People such as myself, working with open-source information, can’t eavesdrop on Iranian phone calls, but I can look at satellite imagery. And I see the same thing.
When Israel started its bombing campaign against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went out of his way to highlight material, saying that “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs—nine.” This material is the MacGuffin in our tale of woe. Iran would have to further enrich this
material to weapons grade, but it could have done so quickly, in a matter of about three weeks, at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
Where is that material now? According to the U.S. intelligence assessment, Iran moved it early on in the conflict, likely to a secret location. That, by the way, is precisely what the Iranians told Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). U.S. officials, no doubt embarrassed by the fact that they had no idea where the material went, tried a number of ridiculous explanations. Vice President J.D. Vance claimed that it was buried. Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that trucks couldn’t move in Iran without being almost immediately targeted by Israel, even though there are numerous satellite images showing trucks arriving at the facilities, followed by images of more trucks covering the entrances with dirt. We now know that the DIA thinks the material is on the lam.
If Iran dashes to a bomb, it will have to further enrich this material and eventually convert it from its current form—gas—into metal hemispheres that can be assembled in a bomb. These steps are called conversion and casting. Vance and others have sought to downplay the dangers of the missing material by claiming that Israel and the United States had completely eliminated Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and fabricate uranium metal.
Even before the latest DIA assessment, it was clear that this was false and that Iran retained a significant ability to reconstitute its uranium enrichment program.
Shortly before the bombing campaign began, there was a contentious meeting of the IAEA board of governors on June 12, from which several important items of information emerged. This meeting has largely been forgotten in the rush of events that followed the bombing campaign, which we now know had been long planned and was on hold until the expiration of the 60-day window that U.S. President Donald Trump claimed he gave to Iran.
During that meeting, Grossi indicated that the IAEA had “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows … which it will not be possible to restore.” What that means, practically, is that the IAEA
no longer knows how many centrifuges Iran has stockpiled or where they are all stored. Iran could use any centrifuges in storage to replace centrifuges that have been destroyed or to set up new centrifuge facilities.
In addition to whatever centrifuges Iran already has, it also can make more. In recent years, Iran has constructed a giant underground facility near Natanz, under the picturesquely named Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La). After Israel conducted a 2021 attack that sabotaged a nearby workshop that made centrifuges, Iran moved the production equipment here. Israel and the United States didn’t strike this underground workshop at Pickaxe Mountain, but Israel did strike the empty buildings elsewhere that used to house the equipment. Perhaps they used a time machine.
Where would Iran install these centrifuges? The assessment reportedly states that Iran “maintains secret nuclear facilities that were not targeted in the strike and remain operational.” One of those sites, according to Jennifer Griffin at Fox News—a really good reporter who asks tough questions—is the so-called third site for enrichment.
foreignpolicy.com
Jeffrey Lewis
JUNE 27, 2025
I’ve spent the past several days telling incredulous reporters that Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran, even with help from the United States, looked anemic—and that it would, at best, set Iran’s nuclear program back by several months, maybe a year if we were lucky.
Now CNN, the New York Times, Reuters, and even a sweating Fox News are reporting on the conclusions of a five-page classified assessment of the strikes that was prepared by the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It turns out that I may have been overestimating the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. That report indicated that the strike has set Iran’s nuclear program back by one to two months on the low end and less than a year on the high end. (The CIA estimate that it would take Iran “years” to rebuild the facilities that were destroyed is beside the
point, since no one thinks Iran will do that.)
The DIA assessment relies on both satellite imagery and signals intelligence. People such as myself, working with open-source information, can’t eavesdrop on Iranian phone calls, but I can look at satellite imagery. And I see the same thing.
When Israel started its bombing campaign against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went out of his way to highlight material, saying that “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs—nine.” This material is the MacGuffin in our tale of woe. Iran would have to further enrich this
material to weapons grade, but it could have done so quickly, in a matter of about three weeks, at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
Where is that material now? According to the U.S. intelligence assessment, Iran moved it early on in the conflict, likely to a secret location. That, by the way, is precisely what the Iranians told Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). U.S. officials, no doubt embarrassed by the fact that they had no idea where the material went, tried a number of ridiculous explanations. Vice President J.D. Vance claimed that it was buried. Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that trucks couldn’t move in Iran without being almost immediately targeted by Israel, even though there are numerous satellite images showing trucks arriving at the facilities, followed by images of more trucks covering the entrances with dirt. We now know that the DIA thinks the material is on the lam.
If Iran dashes to a bomb, it will have to further enrich this material and eventually convert it from its current form—gas—into metal hemispheres that can be assembled in a bomb. These steps are called conversion and casting. Vance and others have sought to downplay the dangers of the missing material by claiming that Israel and the United States had completely eliminated Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and fabricate uranium metal.
Even before the latest DIA assessment, it was clear that this was false and that Iran retained a significant ability to reconstitute its uranium enrichment program.
Shortly before the bombing campaign began, there was a contentious meeting of the IAEA board of governors on June 12, from which several important items of information emerged. This meeting has largely been forgotten in the rush of events that followed the bombing campaign, which we now know had been long planned and was on hold until the expiration of the 60-day window that U.S. President Donald Trump claimed he gave to Iran.
During that meeting, Grossi indicated that the IAEA had “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows … which it will not be possible to restore.” What that means, practically, is that the IAEA
no longer knows how many centrifuges Iran has stockpiled or where they are all stored. Iran could use any centrifuges in storage to replace centrifuges that have been destroyed or to set up new centrifuge facilities.
In addition to whatever centrifuges Iran already has, it also can make more. In recent years, Iran has constructed a giant underground facility near Natanz, under the picturesquely named Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La). After Israel conducted a 2021 attack that sabotaged a nearby workshop that made centrifuges, Iran moved the production equipment here. Israel and the United States didn’t strike this underground workshop at Pickaxe Mountain, but Israel did strike the empty buildings elsewhere that used to house the equipment. Perhaps they used a time machine.
Where would Iran install these centrifuges? The assessment reportedly states that Iran “maintains secret nuclear facilities that were not targeted in the strike and remain operational.” One of those sites, according to Jennifer Griffin at Fox News—a really good reporter who asks tough questions—is the so-called third site for enrichment.
Iran Is on Course for a Bomb After U.S. Strikes Fail to Destroy Facilities
Satellite imagery confirms that Iranian capabilities are bruised, not annihilated.
foreignpolicy.com
