Simon Watkins
May 20, 2025
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision last week to lift sanctions on Syria is the logical next step in shifting the country back into the U.S. sphere of influence that began with Washington’s crucial role in ending the rule of former President Bashar al-Assad on 8 December. It is strategically vital to each of the major global powers for several reasons, with the speed of this move by the U.S. reflecting that, and the fact that Russia especially, has been busily seeking to rebuild its strong grip on the country through several overtures to its new President, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The plans that Washington has in place for Syria now are in large part the same as those that were drawn up in early 2011 when the U.S. believed the al-Assad regime would fall in a matter of weeks. These included options to support Syria’s production of oil and gas, as it was seen as key to the economic and political rebuilding process that would see the new Syria pivot back to the West.
Before Syria became embroiled in its civil war, it was a major oil producer, with an output of around 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil from proved reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Prior to that – before the recovery rate started to decline due to a lack of enhanced oil recovery techniques being employed at the major fields -- it had been producing nearly 600,000 bpd. Europe imported over US$3 billion of oil per year from Syria up to the beginning of 2011, and many European refineries were configured to process the heavy, sour ‘Souedie’ crude oil that makes up much of Syria’s output, with the remainder being the sweet and lighter ‘Syrian Light’ grade. Most of this – some 150,000-bpd combined – went to Germany, Italy, and France, from one of Syria’s three Mediterranean export terminals: Banias, Tartus, and Latakia. As an adjunct to this, a multitude of international oil companies were operating in Syria’s energy sector, including the UK’s Shell, Petrofac and Gulfsands Petroleum, France’s then-Total, the China National Petroleum Corporation, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp, Canada’s Suncor Energy, and Russia’s Tatneft and Stroytransgaz.
The country’s gas sector was at least as significant as its oil one, with output of about 316 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of dry natural gas, and proven reserves of 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Russia had already been a major presence in this sector before the civil war began in 2011. With Stroytransgaz starting up the build out of Syria’s South-Central Gas Area in 2009, which by 2011 had boosted the country’s natural gas production by about 40%. This allowed Syria’s combined oil and gas exports to generate a quarter of government revenues at that point, making it the eastern Mediterranean’s leading oil and gas producer at the time. With heavy military intervention from Russia having shored up al-Assad’s power, the two nations agreed to the 2015 Cooperation Plan that covered the restoration of at least 40 energy facilities in Syria (including offshore oil fields), together with the build-out of the power sector. The deal also covered the full reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Aleppo thermal plant, the installation of the Deir Ezzor power plant, and the expansion of capacity of the Mharda and Tishreen plants, with a view to re-energising Syria’s power grid and restoring the main control centre for the grid back to Damascus. An additional key infrastructure project was the repair and capacity-boosting upgrading of the Homs oil refinery (Syria’s other refinery was then in Banias). The initial target capacity was 140,000 bpd, Phase 2’s was 240,000 bpd, and Phase 3’s was 360,000 bpd. The intention was that it could also be used to refine Iranian oil coming through Iraq if needed, before onward shipment into southern Europe.
The U.S.’s original plans – and the current ones – aim to include a similarly wide-ranging brief for the resuscitation of Syria’s oil and gas sectors and are also set to feature a dramatically enhanced security presence to safeguard the interests of U.S. and Western firms instrumental in these projects. The U.K. – which played a vital role alongside the U.S. in the ousting of al-Assad – recently lifted sanctions on several major Syrian firms, particularly those connected to its former cornerstone oil and gas sectors as part of a coordinated strategy by the West to secure the western flank of the Middle East that has unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea. The coastline encompasses Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt and is regarded as a strategic zero-sum game by both the West and the East, given the access it provides to the world’s sea routes and to land routes along in southern Europe and northern Africa, as fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The multiple advantages of securing influence over what happens down that coastline are magnified for whichever side has it by the fact that the other side does not.
For Russia, it will be even more of a strategic disaster if the U.S. is successful, given its own vast military and intelligence presence in the country. This is the reason why the first official high-level visit to Syria after the fall of al-Assad was by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on 28 January. He met with President al-Sharaa, together with his Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Minister of Health Maher al-Sharaa. After the meetings, he confirmed that his country had been in direct contact with al-Sharaa’s radical Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, about the future of its energy projects and of its key military bases across Syria as well. These comprise the naval base at Tartus – Russia’s only Mediterranean port, its Khmeimim air force base near Latakia, and its huge listening station nearby. Aside from these prized assets and its oil and gas riches, Russia prizes Syria as the biggest country on the western side of the Shia Crescent of Power that Moscow had been meticulously developing for years as a counterpoint to the U.S.’s own sphere of influence centred then on Saudi Arabia (for hydrocarbons supplies) and Israel (for military and intelligence assets).
oilprice.com
May 20, 2025
- Trump’s lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria marks a push to bring the country back into the Western sphere of influence following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad.
- The U.S. and U.K. aim to revive Syria’s pre-war oil and gas sectors, once a major source of European energy.
- Russia views U.S. involvement as a serious threat to its influence in Syria, where it maintains critical military bases and energy interests.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision last week to lift sanctions on Syria is the logical next step in shifting the country back into the U.S. sphere of influence that began with Washington’s crucial role in ending the rule of former President Bashar al-Assad on 8 December. It is strategically vital to each of the major global powers for several reasons, with the speed of this move by the U.S. reflecting that, and the fact that Russia especially, has been busily seeking to rebuild its strong grip on the country through several overtures to its new President, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The plans that Washington has in place for Syria now are in large part the same as those that were drawn up in early 2011 when the U.S. believed the al-Assad regime would fall in a matter of weeks. These included options to support Syria’s production of oil and gas, as it was seen as key to the economic and political rebuilding process that would see the new Syria pivot back to the West.
Before Syria became embroiled in its civil war, it was a major oil producer, with an output of around 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil from proved reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Prior to that – before the recovery rate started to decline due to a lack of enhanced oil recovery techniques being employed at the major fields -- it had been producing nearly 600,000 bpd. Europe imported over US$3 billion of oil per year from Syria up to the beginning of 2011, and many European refineries were configured to process the heavy, sour ‘Souedie’ crude oil that makes up much of Syria’s output, with the remainder being the sweet and lighter ‘Syrian Light’ grade. Most of this – some 150,000-bpd combined – went to Germany, Italy, and France, from one of Syria’s three Mediterranean export terminals: Banias, Tartus, and Latakia. As an adjunct to this, a multitude of international oil companies were operating in Syria’s energy sector, including the UK’s Shell, Petrofac and Gulfsands Petroleum, France’s then-Total, the China National Petroleum Corporation, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp, Canada’s Suncor Energy, and Russia’s Tatneft and Stroytransgaz.
The country’s gas sector was at least as significant as its oil one, with output of about 316 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of dry natural gas, and proven reserves of 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Russia had already been a major presence in this sector before the civil war began in 2011. With Stroytransgaz starting up the build out of Syria’s South-Central Gas Area in 2009, which by 2011 had boosted the country’s natural gas production by about 40%. This allowed Syria’s combined oil and gas exports to generate a quarter of government revenues at that point, making it the eastern Mediterranean’s leading oil and gas producer at the time. With heavy military intervention from Russia having shored up al-Assad’s power, the two nations agreed to the 2015 Cooperation Plan that covered the restoration of at least 40 energy facilities in Syria (including offshore oil fields), together with the build-out of the power sector. The deal also covered the full reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Aleppo thermal plant, the installation of the Deir Ezzor power plant, and the expansion of capacity of the Mharda and Tishreen plants, with a view to re-energising Syria’s power grid and restoring the main control centre for the grid back to Damascus. An additional key infrastructure project was the repair and capacity-boosting upgrading of the Homs oil refinery (Syria’s other refinery was then in Banias). The initial target capacity was 140,000 bpd, Phase 2’s was 240,000 bpd, and Phase 3’s was 360,000 bpd. The intention was that it could also be used to refine Iranian oil coming through Iraq if needed, before onward shipment into southern Europe.
The U.S.’s original plans – and the current ones – aim to include a similarly wide-ranging brief for the resuscitation of Syria’s oil and gas sectors and are also set to feature a dramatically enhanced security presence to safeguard the interests of U.S. and Western firms instrumental in these projects. The U.K. – which played a vital role alongside the U.S. in the ousting of al-Assad – recently lifted sanctions on several major Syrian firms, particularly those connected to its former cornerstone oil and gas sectors as part of a coordinated strategy by the West to secure the western flank of the Middle East that has unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea. The coastline encompasses Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt and is regarded as a strategic zero-sum game by both the West and the East, given the access it provides to the world’s sea routes and to land routes along in southern Europe and northern Africa, as fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The multiple advantages of securing influence over what happens down that coastline are magnified for whichever side has it by the fact that the other side does not.
For Russia, it will be even more of a strategic disaster if the U.S. is successful, given its own vast military and intelligence presence in the country. This is the reason why the first official high-level visit to Syria after the fall of al-Assad was by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on 28 January. He met with President al-Sharaa, together with his Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Minister of Health Maher al-Sharaa. After the meetings, he confirmed that his country had been in direct contact with al-Sharaa’s radical Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, about the future of its energy projects and of its key military bases across Syria as well. These comprise the naval base at Tartus – Russia’s only Mediterranean port, its Khmeimim air force base near Latakia, and its huge listening station nearby. Aside from these prized assets and its oil and gas riches, Russia prizes Syria as the biggest country on the western side of the Shia Crescent of Power that Moscow had been meticulously developing for years as a counterpoint to the U.S.’s own sphere of influence centred then on Saudi Arabia (for hydrocarbons supplies) and Israel (for military and intelligence assets).
The Real Strategic Reasons Why Trump Is Lifting Sanctions On Syria | OilPrice.com
Trump’s lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria marks a push to bring the country back into the Western sphere of influence following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad.
oilprice.com
