23 JUN 2025
Hao Nan
Research fellow, Charhar Institute
China’s unique energy structure, robust strategic planning and diplomatic positioning may help it weather the storm if the Strait of Hormuz is suddenly blocked. Academic Hao Nan explains.
As missiles rain across Iran and Israel and further escalation looms, the global community is bracing for a possible strategic nightmare: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which media reports said the Iranian parliament has approved. Since 13 June, Israel and Iran have plunged into their most intense military confrontation yet. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion struck Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure with deadly force, prompting a fierce Iranian retaliation — True Promise III — targeting Israeli cities, followed by a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer.
With diplomacy suspended and escalation likely, Tehran’s threat to close the Strait — through which a fifth of the world’s oil flows — has reignited fears of an energy shock. Among the countries most often cited as vulnerable is China. But contrary to popular belief, China may be better positioned than others to withstand the fallout of such a crisis.
Strengths in coping with possible Strait of Hormuz closure
China’s unique energy structure, robust strategic planning and diplomatic positioning mean that it is unlikely to suffer immediate or disproportionate consequences if the Strait of Hormuz is temporarily blocked. While China is the world’s largest energy consumer and a top importer of Middle Eastern crude, its vulnerability has been overstated. Not only has Beijing diversified its energy sources and routes, but it has also built up considerable strategic reserves and reduced reliance on imported oil relative to its total energy consumption.
To understand China’s resilience, one must begin with its energy mix. Since 2021, China has maintained an energy self-sufficiency rate above 80%. As of 2024, coal, hydropower, and renewables make up the bulk of its domestic energy portfolio. Oil and natural gas account for just 18.2% and 8.9% of total primary energy consumption, respectively — figures notably lower than those in many Western industrial economies. While it is true that in 2024 over 70% of China’s oil and more than 40% of its natural gas were imported, these numbers require context.
China’s energy buffers
China has not placed all its energy eggs in the Middle Eastern basket. Though the Middle East supplies roughly over half of China’s crude imports and a quarter of its LNG, mainly from Qatar, China has built alternative energy corridors. Russia, Central Asia, Brazil, Angola and Australia now supply a growing share of its fossil fuels. Importantly, much of this energy arrives via land pipelines or maritime routes that bypass Hormuz altogether. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, and growing Russian LNG imports through the Arctic demonstrate a deliberate strategy of diversification.
Liquified natural gas (LNG) storage tanks are seen at PetroChina’s receiving terminal in Dalian, Liaoning province, China, on 16 July 2018. (Aizhu Chen/Reuters)
Even in the event of a supply shock, China’s strategic petroleum reserves offer a critical cushion. Beijing has quietly built up a stockpile of around 100 days’ worth of crude oil at the 2024 level, stored in both state-owned and commercial facilities. Its natural gas storage capacity, while less robust, still covers about 35 days of demand at the 2023 level. These buffers provide valuable time for market stabilisation or diplomatic resolution, mitigating the panic that could engulf more import-dependent countries.
While the material impact on China might be contained in the short term, Beijing’s strategic interests in the region mean it cannot afford to be indifferent to developments in the Gulf. Iran is not just an energy partner but a pivotal player in China’s Middle East strategy.
Following Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Middle East tour in 2022, and Beijing’s 2023 diplomatic facilitation of Iran-Saudi reconciliation, China has been clearly advocating regional reconciliation and a regional security architecture rooted in local agency and non-intervention. A military conflagration — especially one that topples the Iranian regime — would severely disrupt that framework and undermine China’s efforts as a stabilising actor.
It is in this context that China’s current diplomatic posture must be read. In recent days, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held emergency calls with both his Iranian and Israeli counterparts. China has condemned Israel’s airstrikes as violations of Iranian sovereignty and urged all parties to de-escalate.
Notably, Beijing has refrained from overtly siding with Tehran militarily, recognising the fine line between partnership and entanglement. Instead, China is likely to engage in quiet shuttle diplomacy, leveraging its ties with Iran, the GCC and Russia while tacitly endorsing broader stabilisation efforts led by the US and European countries.
Unlike the US or the UK, whose aircraft carrier strike group, warship and military jet deployments in the region suggest readiness for direct involvement, China is unlikely to send military assets to the Gulf. Not only does this reflect its non-interventionist doctrine, but it also minimises the risk of confrontation with Western powers or Iran’s rivals.
However, should the crisis deepen, we can expect China to push for emergency UN resolutions, explore backchannel negotiations and possibly convene multilateral dialogues involving Russia and regional stakeholders to preserve both energy flows and regime stability in Iran.
Middle East regional countries, long expecting China to do more, might argue that China’s limited involvement amounts to strategic passivity. But Beijing’s approach is shaped not by indifference, but by calculation.
A Hormuz closure is unlikely to serve Iran’s interests in the long term — alienating GCC nations, exacerbating global inflation, and inviting retaliatory action. China understands that Tehran’s threats are driven by desperation, not strategy. By remaining engaged but not embroiled, China preserves its long game: positioning itself as a stable power broker in a region long dominated by Western military intervention.
Solar panels and wind turbines are seen at the Huaneng Binzhou new energy power generation project in Binzhou, in China’s eastern Shandong province on 11 June 2025. (AFP)
The Middle East is on the edge of a knife, and the next few weeks may define the region’s trajectory for years to come. Yet amid the volatility, the assumption that China will be the biggest loser in a Strait of Hormuz crisis does not hold up to scrutiny. With diversified supplies, deep reserves and an expanding diplomatic toolkit, China is better prepared than most to ride out the storm — and maybe even emerge with greater regional clout.
www.thinkchina.sg
Hao Nan
Research fellow, Charhar Institute
China’s unique energy structure, robust strategic planning and diplomatic positioning may help it weather the storm if the Strait of Hormuz is suddenly blocked. Academic Hao Nan explains.
As missiles rain across Iran and Israel and further escalation looms, the global community is bracing for a possible strategic nightmare: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which media reports said the Iranian parliament has approved. Since 13 June, Israel and Iran have plunged into their most intense military confrontation yet. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion struck Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure with deadly force, prompting a fierce Iranian retaliation — True Promise III — targeting Israeli cities, followed by a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer.
With diplomacy suspended and escalation likely, Tehran’s threat to close the Strait — through which a fifth of the world’s oil flows — has reignited fears of an energy shock. Among the countries most often cited as vulnerable is China. But contrary to popular belief, China may be better positioned than others to withstand the fallout of such a crisis.
Strengths in coping with possible Strait of Hormuz closure
China’s unique energy structure, robust strategic planning and diplomatic positioning mean that it is unlikely to suffer immediate or disproportionate consequences if the Strait of Hormuz is temporarily blocked. While China is the world’s largest energy consumer and a top importer of Middle Eastern crude, its vulnerability has been overstated. Not only has Beijing diversified its energy sources and routes, but it has also built up considerable strategic reserves and reduced reliance on imported oil relative to its total energy consumption.
Importantly, much of this energy arrives via land pipelines or maritime routes that bypass Hormuz altogether.
To understand China’s resilience, one must begin with its energy mix. Since 2021, China has maintained an energy self-sufficiency rate above 80%. As of 2024, coal, hydropower, and renewables make up the bulk of its domestic energy portfolio. Oil and natural gas account for just 18.2% and 8.9% of total primary energy consumption, respectively — figures notably lower than those in many Western industrial economies. While it is true that in 2024 over 70% of China’s oil and more than 40% of its natural gas were imported, these numbers require context.
China’s energy buffers
China has not placed all its energy eggs in the Middle Eastern basket. Though the Middle East supplies roughly over half of China’s crude imports and a quarter of its LNG, mainly from Qatar, China has built alternative energy corridors. Russia, Central Asia, Brazil, Angola and Australia now supply a growing share of its fossil fuels. Importantly, much of this energy arrives via land pipelines or maritime routes that bypass Hormuz altogether. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, and growing Russian LNG imports through the Arctic demonstrate a deliberate strategy of diversification.
Liquified natural gas (LNG) storage tanks are seen at PetroChina’s receiving terminal in Dalian, Liaoning province, China, on 16 July 2018. (Aizhu Chen/Reuters)
Even in the event of a supply shock, China’s strategic petroleum reserves offer a critical cushion. Beijing has quietly built up a stockpile of around 100 days’ worth of crude oil at the 2024 level, stored in both state-owned and commercial facilities. Its natural gas storage capacity, while less robust, still covers about 35 days of demand at the 2023 level. These buffers provide valuable time for market stabilisation or diplomatic resolution, mitigating the panic that could engulf more import-dependent countries.
Instead, China is likely to engage in quiet shuttle diplomacy, leveraging its ties with Iran, the GCC and Russia while tacitly endorsing broader stabilisation efforts led by the US and European countries.
Attuned to developments in the GulfWhile the material impact on China might be contained in the short term, Beijing’s strategic interests in the region mean it cannot afford to be indifferent to developments in the Gulf. Iran is not just an energy partner but a pivotal player in China’s Middle East strategy.
Following Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Middle East tour in 2022, and Beijing’s 2023 diplomatic facilitation of Iran-Saudi reconciliation, China has been clearly advocating regional reconciliation and a regional security architecture rooted in local agency and non-intervention. A military conflagration — especially one that topples the Iranian regime — would severely disrupt that framework and undermine China’s efforts as a stabilising actor.
It is in this context that China’s current diplomatic posture must be read. In recent days, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held emergency calls with both his Iranian and Israeli counterparts. China has condemned Israel’s airstrikes as violations of Iranian sovereignty and urged all parties to de-escalate.
Notably, Beijing has refrained from overtly siding with Tehran militarily, recognising the fine line between partnership and entanglement. Instead, China is likely to engage in quiet shuttle diplomacy, leveraging its ties with Iran, the GCC and Russia while tacitly endorsing broader stabilisation efforts led by the US and European countries.
Unlike the US or the UK, whose aircraft carrier strike group, warship and military jet deployments in the region suggest readiness for direct involvement, China is unlikely to send military assets to the Gulf. Not only does this reflect its non-interventionist doctrine, but it also minimises the risk of confrontation with Western powers or Iran’s rivals.
However, should the crisis deepen, we can expect China to push for emergency UN resolutions, explore backchannel negotiations and possibly convene multilateral dialogues involving Russia and regional stakeholders to preserve both energy flows and regime stability in Iran.
By remaining engaged but not embroiled, China preserves its long game: positioning itself as a stable power broker in a region long dominated by Western military intervention.
Remaining engaged but not embroiledMiddle East regional countries, long expecting China to do more, might argue that China’s limited involvement amounts to strategic passivity. But Beijing’s approach is shaped not by indifference, but by calculation.
A Hormuz closure is unlikely to serve Iran’s interests in the long term — alienating GCC nations, exacerbating global inflation, and inviting retaliatory action. China understands that Tehran’s threats are driven by desperation, not strategy. By remaining engaged but not embroiled, China preserves its long game: positioning itself as a stable power broker in a region long dominated by Western military intervention.
Solar panels and wind turbines are seen at the Huaneng Binzhou new energy power generation project in Binzhou, in China’s eastern Shandong province on 11 June 2025. (AFP)
The Middle East is on the edge of a knife, and the next few weeks may define the region’s trajectory for years to come. Yet amid the volatility, the assumption that China will be the biggest loser in a Strait of Hormuz crisis does not hold up to scrutiny. With diversified supplies, deep reserves and an expanding diplomatic toolkit, China is better prepared than most to ride out the storm — and maybe even emerge with greater regional clout.
Strait of Hormuz blockade: Why Beijing is better prepared than you think
China’s unique energy structure, robust strategic planning and diplomatic positioning may help it weather the storm if the Strait of Hormuz is suddenly blocked. Academic Hao Nan explains.
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