Only politicians who lie and steal tell you that.
Here in Canada corrupt politicians who lie and steal are rare, we've got the Ford family here in Ontario, but otherwise I believe that most cons here aren't crooks.
Ukraine updates
- Thread starter mandrill
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Here in Canada corrupt politicians who lie and steal are rare, we've got the Ford family here in Ontario, but otherwise I believe that most cons here aren't crooks.
Russian hypersonics?
Ukraine shot down 6 using the Patriot system.
So what did Putin do?
Russia detains hypersonic missile engineers for treason
Three scientists of the Novosibirsk Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, who were engaged in the development of hypersonic missiles, were arrested one by one by the security forces under the high treason article.
But he lives in Quebec. Where there is indeed much more corruption than in the rest of Canada.
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No proof on Russian hypersonic missile shot down!! It just claimed by Ukrainian President Zelensky! Like I said before patriot systems missile could even shoot down a Iraq scud missile.lol. Nothing but more fake propaganda by Zelensky ( “ Baghdad Bob “) ring a bell ? Anyone?Russian hypersonics?
Ukraine shot down 6 using the Patriot system.
So what did Putin do?
Russia detains hypersonic missile engineers for treason
Three scientists of the Novosibirsk Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, who were engaged in the development of hypersonic missiles, were arrested one by one by the security forces under the high treason article.news.yahoo.com
Russia’s most potent hypersonic weapon neutralised, says Ukraine
Intense night-time bombardment of Kyiv damaged Patriot air defence system, air command confirms
www.theguardian.com
Or maybe you are correct or maybe this is the aftermath of the remnants of the missile when it hit the target and left over fragments.
Just possibly of more spin! Like Baghdad Bob ! Very difficult to tell who telling truth for now. Eventually time will tell who telling the truth. Truth have a habit of coming out or seeping out! Or possibly a defective missile built with fake knockoffs parts from China!
Now don’t see any USA military analysis or Miltary Defense contractors who built the Patriot bragging about the system Patriot shooting down a hypersonic missile! I pretty sure a spokesperson fromPentagon should & would had brag about shooting down a hypersonic missile! So anything come out from Ukrainian defence ministry ( known to me as Baghdad Dad Bob)…LOL.
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Ukraine and the Kinzhal: Don’t believe the hypersonic hype
www.brookings.edu
1) RUSSIAN HYPERSONICS ARE ALREADY HERE
The first part of the hype is Putin’s claim that Russian hypersonics are already here and being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Hypersonic weapons are a broad category of missiles whose only common characteristic is that they can reach a speed of Mach 5, which the German V-2 achieved in 1944. The term “hypersonic” is now typically used just to refer to two types of weapons that are being developed through contemporary defense programs: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). The Kinzhal is neither, as it is an air-launched ballistic missile. Moreover, Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russia’s entire volley of six Kinzhals indicates that the missile’s alleged status as a hypersonic system is at best questionable.
2) HYPERSONICS CANNOT BE INTERCEPTED
HGVs and HCMs are, indeed, more difficult to intercept than ballistic missiles using current missile defenses, although hypersonics may be even more difficult to produce in the first place: The U.S. Air Force’s HGV Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon was canceled after multiple failures during testing. The technical challenges of developing HCMs are even greater, posing serious questions about when or if the allegedly deployed Russian HCMs were tested sufficiently or will be useful. Moreover, interception of even these bleeding-edge weapons isn’t impossible. Existing missile defenses can already intercept missiles traveling far faster than HGVs or HCMs, and could be adapted to intercept hypersonic missiles as well. A satellite constellation to track HGVs is planned to be in orbit by 2025. Moreover, as of 2022, the U.S. Aegis sea-based terminal defense system already had a nascent capability to counter hypersonics.
3) THE UNITED STATES IS BEHIND ON HYPERSONICS DEVELOPMENT
The United States appears to be well ahead of Russia and China in its ability to defend against hypersonics. However, if one measures success by allegedly deployed offensive hypersonic systems, the United States is indeed behind. But that would be like measuring the success of the Chinese military’s adoption of artificial intelligence by announcements made at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
We do know a great deal about how well-tested China’s and Russia’s HGV systems are since they are launched from easily-detected ballistic missiles; the open-source community alone has reported on numerous Chinese and Russian HGV tests. While some Chinese HGV systems have been tested frequently, the Russian ones have not, and reactions to both have been hyped. For example, some technological developments that have been presented as novel are simply not: Although China made international news in July 2021 by testing an HGV that was also a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), an “exotic” hypersonic weapon allegedly capable of flying around the world and carrying a nuclear warhead; FOBS is an old technology that was first developed and deployed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Similarly, while the Russians have tested their Avangard HGV four times (with one failure), it is unclear whether this is (or should be) sufficient to qualify as fielding the system. Russia’s Zircon HCM allegedly has a suspiciously perfect test track record, but also suffers from inherent limitations of existing HCM technologies. Rather than being genuinely “behind,” the United States’ more cautious approach to its own programs and statements about them likely reflects its reticence to field insufficiently tested systems.
4) HYPERSONICS THREATEN STRATEGIC STABILITY
There is also a question as to whether being “behind” in the development of novel hypersonic capabilities actually matters — whether an asymmetry disrupts a fragile stability. China and Russia already possess sufficient intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities to swamp U.S. missile defenses, and so the marginal added value of an additional system that can overcome the same defenses is questionable. Moreover, a recent Congressional Budget Office report found limited roles in which hypersonics would clearly be superior to other extant weapons systems, noted that they are more expensive than other options, and questioned whether hypersonics were more survivable. Determining whether hypersonics will cause a net increase or decrease in incentives to strike first is highly contingent; current plans and deployments do not appear to do so. It is possible that future developments will change this equation but predicting the future of strategic stability is speculative rather than a basis for engaging in another arms race.
5) ARMS CONTROL FOR HYPERSONICS IS USELESS
A three-way hypersonics arms race appears to be gathering steam between China, Russia, and the United States. China’s heavy investment in hypersonics appears to be in reaction to the United States’ development of hypersonics, indicating a security dilemma dynamic that is ripe for arms control measures. Given the unclear long-term implications for strategic stability, the technical difficulties with engineering and deploying such systems, the apparent security dilemma dynamics, and the expense of doing so, arms control has a clear role to play here.
Rather than being trapped by narrower notions of arms control, we should think about creative solutions. Simple, easily verifiable measures such as a moratorium on testing hypersonic glide vehicles would help to cool off this race to nowhere; since China believes it is ahead in offensive hypersonics development, this may be a rare issue on which they would prefer to lock in that lead. While Russia is busy tearing up arms control treaties and, therefore, unlikely to participate, it is also subject to severe sanctions and engulfed in a conflict that makes it difficult for Russia to mount a hypersonics program capable of besting the United States’ right now. Confidence-building measures that address deployments which threaten strategic stability, such as clear separation of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, would also be attractive to all parties, since they require no reductions but could nonetheless prove stabilizing. Quantitative limitations, possibly in the form of asymmetric arms control for hypersonics in which parties accept different reductions or ceilings for forces or exchange one weapon for a different kind of weapon, which have a history of success where symmetrical reductions failed, might also be more tolerable and could prevent costs from rapidly spiraling out of control. But none of these measures can have a chance while we remain under the sway of the hypersonic hype.
Thus, reporting of Ukraine’s shootdown of Russian hypersonics tells only a partial truth. Russian hypersonic missiles do not yet pose the dire threat to Western interests that has been so breathlessly reported in the media. This makes it an opportune time to invest in defenses and allocate resources to arms control — before the real Russian hypersonic threat emerges.
Ukraine and the Kinzhal: Don’t believe the hypersonic hype
Reporting of Ukraine’s shootdown of Russian hypersonics tells only a partial truth. Russian hypersonic missiles do not yet pose the dire threat to Western interests.
www.brookings.edu
1) RUSSIAN HYPERSONICS ARE ALREADY HERE
The first part of the hype is Putin’s claim that Russian hypersonics are already here and being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Hypersonic weapons are a broad category of missiles whose only common characteristic is that they can reach a speed of Mach 5, which the German V-2 achieved in 1944. The term “hypersonic” is now typically used just to refer to two types of weapons that are being developed through contemporary defense programs: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). The Kinzhal is neither, as it is an air-launched ballistic missile. Moreover, Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russia’s entire volley of six Kinzhals indicates that the missile’s alleged status as a hypersonic system is at best questionable.
2) HYPERSONICS CANNOT BE INTERCEPTED
HGVs and HCMs are, indeed, more difficult to intercept than ballistic missiles using current missile defenses, although hypersonics may be even more difficult to produce in the first place: The U.S. Air Force’s HGV Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon was canceled after multiple failures during testing. The technical challenges of developing HCMs are even greater, posing serious questions about when or if the allegedly deployed Russian HCMs were tested sufficiently or will be useful. Moreover, interception of even these bleeding-edge weapons isn’t impossible. Existing missile defenses can already intercept missiles traveling far faster than HGVs or HCMs, and could be adapted to intercept hypersonic missiles as well. A satellite constellation to track HGVs is planned to be in orbit by 2025. Moreover, as of 2022, the U.S. Aegis sea-based terminal defense system already had a nascent capability to counter hypersonics.
3) THE UNITED STATES IS BEHIND ON HYPERSONICS DEVELOPMENT
The United States appears to be well ahead of Russia and China in its ability to defend against hypersonics. However, if one measures success by allegedly deployed offensive hypersonic systems, the United States is indeed behind. But that would be like measuring the success of the Chinese military’s adoption of artificial intelligence by announcements made at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
We do know a great deal about how well-tested China’s and Russia’s HGV systems are since they are launched from easily-detected ballistic missiles; the open-source community alone has reported on numerous Chinese and Russian HGV tests. While some Chinese HGV systems have been tested frequently, the Russian ones have not, and reactions to both have been hyped. For example, some technological developments that have been presented as novel are simply not: Although China made international news in July 2021 by testing an HGV that was also a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), an “exotic” hypersonic weapon allegedly capable of flying around the world and carrying a nuclear warhead; FOBS is an old technology that was first developed and deployed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Similarly, while the Russians have tested their Avangard HGV four times (with one failure), it is unclear whether this is (or should be) sufficient to qualify as fielding the system. Russia’s Zircon HCM allegedly has a suspiciously perfect test track record, but also suffers from inherent limitations of existing HCM technologies. Rather than being genuinely “behind,” the United States’ more cautious approach to its own programs and statements about them likely reflects its reticence to field insufficiently tested systems.
4) HYPERSONICS THREATEN STRATEGIC STABILITY
There is also a question as to whether being “behind” in the development of novel hypersonic capabilities actually matters — whether an asymmetry disrupts a fragile stability. China and Russia already possess sufficient intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities to swamp U.S. missile defenses, and so the marginal added value of an additional system that can overcome the same defenses is questionable. Moreover, a recent Congressional Budget Office report found limited roles in which hypersonics would clearly be superior to other extant weapons systems, noted that they are more expensive than other options, and questioned whether hypersonics were more survivable. Determining whether hypersonics will cause a net increase or decrease in incentives to strike first is highly contingent; current plans and deployments do not appear to do so. It is possible that future developments will change this equation but predicting the future of strategic stability is speculative rather than a basis for engaging in another arms race.
5) ARMS CONTROL FOR HYPERSONICS IS USELESS
A three-way hypersonics arms race appears to be gathering steam between China, Russia, and the United States. China’s heavy investment in hypersonics appears to be in reaction to the United States’ development of hypersonics, indicating a security dilemma dynamic that is ripe for arms control measures. Given the unclear long-term implications for strategic stability, the technical difficulties with engineering and deploying such systems, the apparent security dilemma dynamics, and the expense of doing so, arms control has a clear role to play here.
Rather than being trapped by narrower notions of arms control, we should think about creative solutions. Simple, easily verifiable measures such as a moratorium on testing hypersonic glide vehicles would help to cool off this race to nowhere; since China believes it is ahead in offensive hypersonics development, this may be a rare issue on which they would prefer to lock in that lead. While Russia is busy tearing up arms control treaties and, therefore, unlikely to participate, it is also subject to severe sanctions and engulfed in a conflict that makes it difficult for Russia to mount a hypersonics program capable of besting the United States’ right now. Confidence-building measures that address deployments which threaten strategic stability, such as clear separation of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, would also be attractive to all parties, since they require no reductions but could nonetheless prove stabilizing. Quantitative limitations, possibly in the form of asymmetric arms control for hypersonics in which parties accept different reductions or ceilings for forces or exchange one weapon for a different kind of weapon, which have a history of success where symmetrical reductions failed, might also be more tolerable and could prevent costs from rapidly spiraling out of control. But none of these measures can have a chance while we remain under the sway of the hypersonic hype.
Thus, reporting of Ukraine’s shootdown of Russian hypersonics tells only a partial truth. Russian hypersonic missiles do not yet pose the dire threat to Western interests that has been so breathlessly reported in the media. This makes it an opportune time to invest in defenses and allocate resources to arms control — before the real Russian hypersonic threat emerges.
I went to school in the US and there were many Chinese students, many Indian students, many Korean students, many Mexican, Latin American and other South American students and even one or two Canadian students.
But not a single Russian one.
So if you are implying that Russians are educated in the best US universities and go back to Russia to make superior weapons to be used against Ukraine, sorry, that is just not true. If it were true how do you then explain how the Patriots that the dumb people created shot down all the untouchable hypersonic missiles Russia lobbed at Ukraine? Does not add up, does it?
My very limited understanding of this is that:Ukraine and the Kinzhal: Don’t believe the hypersonic hype
Ukraine and the Kinzhal: Don’t believe the hypersonic hype
Reporting of Ukraine’s shootdown of Russian hypersonics tells only a partial truth. Russian hypersonic missiles do not yet pose the dire threat to Western interests.
1) RUSSIAN HYPERSONICS ARE ALREADY HERE
The first part of the hype is Putin’s claim that Russian hypersonics are already here and being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Hypersonic weapons are a broad category of missiles whose only common characteristic is that they can reach a speed of Mach 5, which the German V-2 achieved in 1944. The term “hypersonic” is now typically used just to refer to two types of weapons that are being developed through contemporary defense programs: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). The Kinzhal is neither, as it is an air-launched ballistic missile. Moreover, Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russia’s entire volley of six Kinzhals indicates that the missile’s alleged status as a hypersonic system is at best questionable.
2) HYPERSONICS CANNOT BE INTERCEPTED
HGVs and HCMs are, indeed, more difficult to intercept than ballistic missiles using current missile defenses, although hypersonics may be even more difficult to produce in the first place: The U.S. Air Force’s HGV Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon was canceled after multiple failures during testing. The technical challenges of developing HCMs are even greater, posing serious questions about when or if the allegedly deployed Russian HCMs were tested sufficiently or will be useful. Moreover, interception of even these bleeding-edge weapons isn’t impossible. Existing missile defenses can already intercept missiles traveling far faster than HGVs or HCMs, and could be adapted to intercept hypersonic missiles as well. A satellite constellation to track HGVs is planned to be in orbit by 2025. Moreover, as of 2022, the U.S. Aegis sea-based terminal defense system already had a nascent capability to counter hypersonics.
3) THE UNITED STATES IS BEHIND ON HYPERSONICS DEVELOPMENT
The United States appears to be well ahead of Russia and China in its ability to defend against hypersonics. However, if one measures success by allegedly deployed offensive hypersonic systems, the United States is indeed behind. But that would be like measuring the success of the Chinese military’s adoption of artificial intelligence by announcements made at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
We do know a great deal about how well-tested China’s and Russia’s HGV systems are since they are launched from easily-detected ballistic missiles; the open-source community alone has reported on numerous Chinese and Russian HGV tests. While some Chinese HGV systems have been tested frequently, the Russian ones have not, and reactions to both have been hyped. For example, some technological developments that have been presented as novel are simply not: Although China made international news in July 2021 by testing an HGV that was also a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), an “exotic” hypersonic weapon allegedly capable of flying around the world and carrying a nuclear warhead; FOBS is an old technology that was first developed and deployed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Similarly, while the Russians have tested their Avangard HGV four times (with one failure), it is unclear whether this is (or should be) sufficient to qualify as fielding the system. Russia’s Zircon HCM allegedly has a suspiciously perfect test track record, but also suffers from inherent limitations of existing HCM technologies. Rather than being genuinely “behind,” the United States’ more cautious approach to its own programs and statements about them likely reflects its reticence to field insufficiently tested systems.
4) HYPERSONICS THREATEN STRATEGIC STABILITY
There is also a question as to whether being “behind” in the development of novel hypersonic capabilities actually matters — whether an asymmetry disrupts a fragile stability. China and Russia already possess sufficient intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities to swamp U.S. missile defenses, and so the marginal added value of an additional system that can overcome the same defenses is questionable. Moreover, a recent Congressional Budget Office report found limited roles in which hypersonics would clearly be superior to other extant weapons systems, noted that they are more expensive than other options, and questioned whether hypersonics were more survivable. Determining whether hypersonics will cause a net increase or decrease in incentives to strike first is highly contingent; current plans and deployments do not appear to do so. It is possible that future developments will change this equation but predicting the future of strategic stability is speculative rather than a basis for engaging in another arms race.
5) ARMS CONTROL FOR HYPERSONICS IS USELESS
A three-way hypersonics arms race appears to be gathering steam between China, Russia, and the United States. China’s heavy investment in hypersonics appears to be in reaction to the United States’ development of hypersonics, indicating a security dilemma dynamic that is ripe for arms control measures. Given the unclear long-term implications for strategic stability, the technical difficulties with engineering and deploying such systems, the apparent security dilemma dynamics, and the expense of doing so, arms control has a clear role to play here.
Rather than being trapped by narrower notions of arms control, we should think about creative solutions. Simple, easily verifiable measures such as a moratorium on testing hypersonic glide vehicles would help to cool off this race to nowhere; since China believes it is ahead in offensive hypersonics development, this may be a rare issue on which they would prefer to lock in that lead. While Russia is busy tearing up arms control treaties and, therefore, unlikely to participate, it is also subject to severe sanctions and engulfed in a conflict that makes it difficult for Russia to mount a hypersonics program capable of besting the United States’ right now. Confidence-building measures that address deployments which threaten strategic stability, such as clear separation of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, would also be attractive to all parties, since they require no reductions but could nonetheless prove stabilizing. Quantitative limitations, possibly in the form of asymmetric arms control for hypersonics in which parties accept different reductions or ceilings for forces or exchange one weapon for a different kind of weapon, which have a history of success where symmetrical reductions failed, might also be more tolerable and could prevent costs from rapidly spiraling out of control. But none of these measures can have a chance while we remain under the sway of the hypersonic hype.
Thus, reporting of Ukraine’s shootdown of Russian hypersonics tells only a partial truth. Russian hypersonic missiles do not yet pose the dire threat to Western interests that has been so breathlessly reported in the media. This makes it an opportune time to invest in defenses and allocate resources to arms control — before the real Russian hypersonic threat emerges.
1. All missiles taking a ballistic or a quasi-ballistic path usually have terminal hypersonic velocity, because they fly in space or in very thin air.
2. For a missile to be truly hypersonic it needs to use a scramjet or ramjet propulsion that achieves hypersonic speeds within the atmosphere.
I make no claims as to being "correct" as I don't know.
But from the pictures of these missiles, your hopeful speculation of an alternative explanation being that the missile hit its target is clearly WRONG.
Look at the nose cones of these missiles. Do they look like they hit anything? Or do the ragged holes in the sides suggest that they were hit by shrapnel?
What does your engineer's mind think about these impact signatures?
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/FCTH6QJVIZIW7HCQ5VCAMUQATE.jpg)
Hey, no fair!!! STOP IT!!! The use of logic and trick questions will not be TOLERATED!!!I make no claims as to being "correct" as I don't know.
But from the pictures of these missiles, your hopeful speculation of an alternative explanation being that the missile hit its target is clearly WRONG.
Look at the nose cones of these missiles. Do they look like they hit anything? Or do the ragged holes in the sides suggest that they were hit by shrapnel?
What does your engineer's mind think about these impact signatures?
Ok, back to the scheduled coffee sip and imaginary donut dip.
Could be any other missile ! Clearly look like a dud. I could be wrong! Missile cone get hits .. Don’t they trigger an explosion? And you would get very little fragment. Not an explosion expert! Like I said before maybe you are right or maybe you are wrong! Eventually the truth will come out!I make no claims as to being "correct" as I don't know.
But from the pictures of these missiles, your hopeful speculation of an alternative explanation being that the missile hit its target is clearly WRONG.
Look at the nose cones of these missiles. Do they look like they hit anything? Or do the ragged holes in the sides suggest that they were hit by shrapnel?
What does your engineer's mind think about these impact signatures?
Anything report by Ukraine .. I take with a grain of salt.Remember Baghdad Bob!
As you say, all ballistic missiles are hypersonic.
Another definition of the special hypersonic missile is that it should be highly manoeuverable.
That is what makes it hard to shoot down. Unusual, unpredictable changes in its course. Modern computers can easily calculate a firing solution to intercept anything at any speed, Mach 10 even. But it is the ability to manoeuver quickly and unpredictably is what would make it harder to hit. Russia's Kinzhal missiles do not posses that level of manoeuverability.
In fairness, making anything but the smallest, slowest control inputs at hypersonic speeds is extraordinarily difficult. Anything abrupt would send it tumbling and it would likely break apart in seconds.
You admit you don't know anything about explosives, missiles etc. But you still stick to alternatives that fit your prejudice that nothing can. stop a Kinzhal missile despite the photos you can see. You could do some "research" on it to try to debunk it being a Kinzhal. Iskanders use an almost identical Unitary Warhead. But you are insecure and don't want to know because it threatens your world view.
And you don't have to be a missile expert to see that that chunk of metal did not hit anything head on. And the inward facing impact signature on the side can only be caused by high energy shrapnel.
Are you saying that you couldn't tell if a wrecked car hit a hospital wall or was sideswiped by a motorcycle?
Hell I bet he can't even explain why we burn witches and how we can use that information to detect witches.
I know someone who will never get a sword from a strange woman lying in ponds.
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